“History repeats itself, that’s one of the things that’s wrong with history.” -Clarence Darrow

Hurriyat Gasping for its Last Breath?

by | Jun 8, 2008 | Blog

The Editorial in the Rising Kashmir asks a provocative question: Are we not better off with the mainstream politicians who have been better negotiators and fairly good strategists? (But what about corruption, lack of ethics and feudalistic character which is the hallmark of all politicians in Kashmir?)

Hurriyat in limbo: Both moderates and hardliners should stand up on their own rather than looking to Pakistan for their ideological victory in Kashmir

Influencing a political situation and getting consumed by the existing one are two different genres of the contemporary leadership practices. Keeping this model in view, is it difficult to evaluate the separatist coalition Hurriyat Conference’s 15-year performance – a decade as united forum and past five years as contending factions.

When this multi-party amalgam came into existence in 1993 to pursue its political ideals, Kashmir politics was literally in a shambles. The key pro-India players were living in virtual exile along with their past baggage of guilt and penitence. The political kids, Omar Abdullah and Mahbooba Mufti, were enjoying their familial privileges and their fathers would not even think of pulling crowds in Valley’s villages let alone dreaming a role in the resolution of Kashmir dispute. In fact the 1989 revolution had crowded out the mainstream politics and the resistance politics had an eventful time to thrive on the vacuum.

But 2008 depicts a different story. The same exiled politicians have staged a comeback and we see dozens of individuals with separatist past jumping into mainstream fray. And above all we have been hearing reconciliatory voices from Hurriyat stating that the ‘sins’ of the mainstream politicians could be forgiven but not forgotten. The separatist leadership cannot hide behind the excuses. The argument that Pakistan policy on Kashmir has of late floundered is sheer street logic. After all the insurgency may bring a political problem into the global limelight, it cannot resolve it. The resolution is a multi-track political process, which requires efficient advocates.

After five rounds of talks with two successive prime ministers in India and several sessions with Pakistani President General (Rtd) Musharraf, the moderate Hurriyat should have grown wise enough to state its stand on various issues confronting people. But it is so much confused and disoriented that it has once again resorted to Pakistan’s help. While the Geelani faction seeks Islamabad’s intervention to enforce the boycott campaign it wants to sponsor against the ensuing polls the Mirwiaz faction wants a Pakistani stamp over its latest political ideology. This state of affairs is enough to disappoint the beleaguered people vis-à-vis Hurriyat leadership.

As the assembly elections are approaching and the separatist discourse is getting even more abstract, it is high time that the Hurriyat leadership sat down to retrospect and take trouble to forge a real indigenous thinking among its ranks rather than parroting the jargon fed by track-II specialists from New Delhi and Islamabad. Militancy may have become weaker in Kahsmir due to certain reasons yet the problem in Kashmir is so dynamic in nature that even the complete end of militancy does not guarantee the transition of Kashmir’s collective thought process.

Hurriyat Conference did win some sort of acceptance among policy circles of New Delhi or Islamabad due to militancy yet its long-term constituency has been the popular sentiment. The civil society reserves the right to question Hurriyat leaders as to why they failed to channel this strength for the greater good of the people. If the “changed circumstances” require a change in strategy so that negotiations are held fruitfully, aren’t we better off with the mainstream politicians who have been better negotiators and fairly good strategists? Is a sizeable faction of Hurriyat losing its way or does it want to reposition itself as a semi-separatist force and enjoy the indirect incentives of power?

These are important questions but an even more important one is this: Is there any space left?